Conventional wisdom holds that it is hard for democratically elected governments to implement structural reforms without incurring in electoral costs. This often holds back governments from passing badly needed reforms to increase markets efficiency or improve the sustainability of public finances. Reforms are usually delayed until when they are made inevitable by the occurrence of a crisis. However, reforms passed during crisis times are likely to have the largest electoral costs for the government in charge, for instance because voters may have difficulties distinguishing the effects on growth of a certain policy versus the business cycle dynamic without any policy intervention.
This course reviews recent academic research on these issues and discusses possible ways for the government to pass important structural reforms without incurring in, or at least limiting, electoral fallouts.
- You will learn why structural reforms are delayed and under what circumstances they are usually implemented
- You will be able to predict when a proposed reform is likely to be successful and when it is not
- You will be able understand what factors shape the response of business and consumer confidence, as well as the reaction of private investors, to reforms
Gabriele Ciminelli is Assistant Professor at the Asia School of Business (ASB) and Research Affiliate at MIT Sloan. His key expertise is in macroeconomics, international finance and political economy. His scholarly work touches a variety of topics. He has analysed issues ranging from the distributional consequences of labor market deregulation reforms to the response of global investors to central bank unconventional policies. Gabriele’s work is very applied. He has contributed to various policy reports. He is also a regular writer of blog posts and op-eds. Gabriele joined ASB in August 2019. Prior to joining ASB, he worked for three years at the International Monetary Fund, where he was Projects Officer at the Research Department
Gabriele obtained a Ph.D. in Economics from Tinbergen Institute and University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) in 2018. Before engaging with economics, he also studied politics. He holds a M.A. in International Relations from Bologna University (Italy).
Assistant Professor of Finance and Economics
AREA OF EXPERTISE
International Finance, Political Economy
Managers of macro investment funds, Political and government consultants, Government officials and Business leaders from industries closely linked to government policy